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Abstract
Why do some international norms succeed, whereas others fail? We argue that norm
campaigns are more likely to succeed when the actions they prescribe are framed as a
solution to salient problems that potential adopters face, even if different from the prob-
lem that originally motivated norm entrepreneurs. For instance, the campaign to reduce
environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies has been more effective when linked to
ﬁscal stability, a common problem that policy makers face. Problem linkages can thus
bolster the attractiveness of a proposed new norm and broaden the coalition of actors
that support the norm. We probe the plausibility of this argument by studying two cam-
paigns that aim to shift patterns of ﬁnance for fossil fuel production and consumption:
subsidy reform and divestment. Subsidy reform encourages governments to reduce sub-
sidies for products like gasoline; divestment encourages investors to sell or avoid equity
stocks from fossil fuel industries. We look at the variation in the impact of these two
campaigns over time and argue that they have achieved institutional acceptance and im-
plementation chieﬂy when their advocates have been able to link environmental goals
with other goals, usually economic ones.
Climate politics has long been dominated by a consequentialist framework,
focusing on cost–beneﬁt analysis and strategies like reciprocity, sanctions, and re-
wards. Yet, given the failures of that approach to generate effective climate gover-
nance, some call for a radically different approach, based on norms, ethics, and the
moral dimension of the problem (e.g., Green 2018a; Milkoreit 2015; Mitchell and
Carpenter 2019; Wapner 2014). Normative considerations underpin many of the
recent supply-side climate policies or proposals that deal with emissions at source
(Green 2018b; Piggot 2018). Advocates of this approach observe the apparent
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success of bans on land mines and nuclear weapons in the arena of interna-
tional security and argue for a similar approach in environmental politics
(see, e.g., Christoff and Eckersley 2013; Newell and Simms 2019). They favor
outright bans on fossil fuel–related behavior and technologies, such as coal
mining (Blondeel and Van de Graaf 2018) or internal combustion engines
(Meckling and Nahm 2019), as opposed to a more technocratic, interest-based
approach (e.g., carbon tax or renewable energy subsidies). This debate leaves
unsettled the question, is a normative or interest-based approach most effective
in producing desirable environmental outcomes?
In this article, we highlight a middle way that combines these two ap-
proaches using a key mechanism of norm success: problem linkages. Norm
campaigns are more likely to succeed when the actions they prescribe can be
framed as solving additional problems that are important to the norm addressees
(i.e., those actors governed by a norm and expected to implement it), beyond
the primary objective that originally motivated norm entrepreneurs (i.e., those ac-
tors interested in changing social norms). This is not the same as arguing that
norms are merely “interests in disguise.” Instead, it is an acknowledgment of the
power of norms to alter perceptions of appropriateness and interest and to
broaden the coalition of actors that support an action.
We assess our argument in the context of two campaigns associated with en-
ergy politics, where anti–fossil fuel activism is on the rise (Cheon and Urpelainen
2018; Green 2018a; Neville et al. 2019). The ﬁrst, fossil fuel subsidy reform (FFSR),
calls on countries to reform or abolish subsidies for fossil fuels, such as the under-
pricing of gasoline in Iran or tax breaks for offshore oil drilling in the United
Kingdom. The second, fossil fuel divestment (FFD), aims for the withdrawal of
investment capital from fossil fuel stocks, bonds, or funds. Each has a mixed
record of success. We look at the variation in their impact over time and argue
that they have achieved institutional acceptance and implementation chieﬂy
when their advocates have been able to link environmental goals with other
goals, usually economic ones.
Problem linkages are essential to understanding this variation in out-
comes. As we demonstrate below, the FFSR campaign has been linked success-
fully to one of the key problems that policy makers often face: macroeconomic
and ﬁscal stability. Over time, the combined economic and environmental ra-
tionales for the FFSR campaign have proven more successful than the economic
argument did alone. In the FFD case, it was the environmental rationale for di-
vestment that came ﬁrst, before the economic argument. The initial struggles for
the divestment campaign were related to the scant evidence that FFD helps in-
vestors maximize return on investment, at least in the short term. Only more
recently has a growing group of investors become convinced that FFD is a ﬁnan-
cially prudent risk management strategy, due to potential future threats to assets’
values.
Our goal is to conduct a plausibility probe of our theory using two illustra-
tive and distinct case studies, not to compare them directly. We do so by tracing
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the variation in our independent variables and dependent variables within each
case over time. This allows for correspondence testing, showing that our variables
do in fact covary. Our two selected cases meet Eckstein’s (1975) criteria for a plau-
sibility probe. First, they seem critical for the theory to hold, since they are broad
and crosscutting enough to allow for problem linkages to emerge, and they lend
themselves to both environmental and economic framings. Second, they have
special characteristics that could be particularly illuminating for the theory. Both
norms are part of an emerging set of anti–fossil fuel norms (Green 2018a), yet
they are also compatible with neoliberal modes of action. Divestment, for exam-
ple, has been described as a “neo-liberal mode of protest politics” since it “utilizes
free market mechanisms as the principal apparatus for social change” (Mayes et al.
2017, 134; see also Soederberg 2009). We would thus expect the norms of FFSR
and FFD to be diffused sooner than other anti–fossil fuel norms that ﬁt less with
the dominant norm of “liberal environmentalism” (Bernstein 2001), such as coal-
mining moratoria (Blondeel and Van de Graaf 2018).
The next two sections develop our theory. In the fourth and ﬁfth sections,
we empirically assess the testable implications of our theory through two case
studies. The conclusion discusses implications for the norm literature.
What Is Norm Success?
The apparent normative turn in climate change studies and practice immediately
prompts the questions, what does norm success mean, and under what con-
ditions does it occur? This section and the next address those two questions,
respectively.
International norms are “standards of appropriate behavior for actors with
a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). They deﬁne what actors
ought and ought not to do—respect human rights, for instance, or ban chemical
weapons. In our empirical cases, the behavioral prescriptions emanating from
these campaigns are that actors should refrain from economically supporting
fossil fuels. Contrary to binding laws and rules, it is often the case that “norms
are obeyed not because they are enforced, but because they are seen as legiti-
mate” (Florini 1996, 365). Norms spread because actors internalize them, but
also because states and other actors seek legitimation, conformity, and esteem in
the relevant social group with which they identify (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998, 903).
Early studies on international norms focused primarily on institutionali-
zation as the yardstick for success. Institutionalization refers to the degree to
which norms are reﬂected in international law and organizations (Bernstein
2001; Checkel 1998, 340; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 900). It reveals how
many states feel constrained by a particular norm, which can help to situate a
norm along the three stages of the norm’s life cycle: emergence, cascade, and
internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
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Recent research has pointed out, however, that the task of norm entrepre-
neurs does not end once a treaty is signed or a statement is issued. Norms can
often only be agreed upon in international texts if they are vaguely formulated.
This gives rise to situations where there are multiple interpretations of a norm.
Even norms that have been agreed upon in international settings thus remain
subject to continuous contestation (Sandholtz 2008). Alongside institutionali-
zation, a parallel process of implementation must therefore take place (Green
and Colgan 2013; Jinnah 2014). Implementation is described as “the steps nec-
essary to introduce a new international norm’s precepts into formal legal and
policy mechanisms” (Betts and Orchard 2014, 3), and “the subsequent use of
these mechanisms” (Stimmer and Wisken 2019, 521).
Consequently, we propose a two-tiered standard of norm success. First,
norm institutionalization refers to the degree to which a norm is discursively
embraced and accepted by the relevant norm addressees. Evidence of discursive
acceptance can be found in treaties and conventions, agreements, rules, and
standards established by international organizations, resolutions, communi-
qués, and declarations (Bernstein 2001, 30). The norm addressees for the FFSR
case are national governments and international organizations. The norm ad-
dressees for FFD are both public and private (institutional) investors. For both
cases, we compare the declaratory support at the international political level
such as within the G7 and G20, the United Nations (UN), and other relevant
international organizations. For FFD, we also looked for evidence of support
among other public and private actors, including universities, churches, charity
organizations, and—most notably—large institutional investors.
Second, norm implementation refers to the degree to which a norm induces
behavioral change among norm addressees. Since both cases aim to direct ﬁnan-
cial ﬂows away from fossil fuels, evidence of changed behavior can be inferred
from the overall level of subsidies and investment in the oil, gas, and coal in-
dustries. For FFSR, we look at shifts in the total value of fossil fuel subsidies. For
FFD, we examine the value of capital and loans that have become off-limits for
the fossil fuel industry in the wake of the divestment campaign and whether this
has inﬂuenced the industry’s cost of doing business.
Theoretical Logic of Norm Success
In this section, we develop the concept of problem linkages as a critical factor for
norm success. A voluminous scholarship on norm emergence now considers
persuasion as the centrally important mechanism by which political actors de-
velop “shared understandings.” “Normative claims,” Finnemore (1996, 141) as-
serts, “become powerful and prevail by being persuasive.” The most persuasive
norm entrepreneurs are those able to “frame” normative ideas in such a way
that they “resonate” with relevant audiences.
The question, then, is, why are some frames more persuasive than others?
The extant literature provides only a partial answer, despite pointing to a myriad
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of factors. They include the characteristics of the candidate norm, the promi-
nence and status of its supporters, and the usefulness of the norm to states seek-
ing enhanced legitimacy (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms that ﬁt with
pre-existing cultural values (Adler-Nissen 2014; Checkel 1998) or with the
dominant ideas and structures in society are also more likely to gain a foothold
(Busby 2010, 55; Kelley 2008; Okereke 2008). We add another explanation for
the persuasiveness of certain norms over others: the way an idea relates to the
key problems of the day that decision makers face.
As indicated above, we argue that norm campaigns are more likely to suc-
ceed when the actions they prescribe can be used to solve additional problems
that are of immediate importance to the norm addressees, beyond the “good
cause” that originally motivated norm entrepreneurs. This can be achieved
through a deliberate framing strategy geared at establishing problem linkages
between the proposed norm and the salient problems that norm addressees
face. Linkages can occur at the discursive level when a norm is formulated
and codiﬁed in treaties and agreements, as well as at the policy-implementing
level, whereby norms are presented as solutions to the acute problems of the
day.
When a norm is linked to other problems, norm addressees who have only
weak or no initial support for the nominal goal of the norm might decide to
support it, if they see it as a tool for achieving what these norm addressees con-
sider to be their primary short-term concerns. These salient problems will often
be related to the material interests of norm addresees. For example, we show
below that ﬁscal considerations were a key factor explaining the diffusion of
the FFSR norm. Yet, they can also relate to normative considerations. The Jubilee
2000 campaign, for instance, which advocated debt relief for the poorest coun-
tries, gained more supporters through its linkage with religious symbolism,
coupled with the timing of the new millennium (Busby 2010).
These considerations lead to a formal hypothesis:
H: Norm campaigns are more likely to succeed when the actions they pre-
scribe can be framed as a solution to salient problems that norm addressees
face, even if these are different from the problem that originally motivated
norm entrepreneurs.
To some extent, our concept of problem linkages is similar to the idea of
issue linkages used by Keohane and Nye (1977), Krasner (1983), and others
who study international regimes and bargaining. Issue linkage is the idea that
one problem can be solved by linking it to a second problem, so that a solution
to the ﬁrst problem that favors one actor more than another is offset by a solu-
tion to the second problem that favors the other actor. In this way, each actor
gets something that it wants, that is, the resolution of a mutual problem on its
preferred terms. Our concept of problem linkage is different, however, in that it
does not focus on situations of bargaining where actors negotiate and make ex-
plicit deals on the basis of their interests. Instead, we refer to social processes of
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communication, framing, and socialization that shape the beliefs, perceptions,
and preferences of actors.
The logic of our hypothesis also bears resemblance to the idea of cobeneﬁts,
a term often used in policy circles to denote a “win–win” strategy to address two
or more goals simultaneously with a single policy measure. However, contrary
to issue linkages, the concept of cobeneﬁts does not have a clear deﬁnition or
theoretical connotation (Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016).
In fact, we see problem linkages as operating through two subpathways,
which we label the Baptists-and-bootleggers pathway and the cobeneﬁts path-
way.1 These differ based on how much actors share the goals of other actors
advocating for a particular policy. At one extreme, problem linkage operates
by broadening the political coalition in support of a policy by joining together
actors who do not share each other’s goals at all. This is the Baptists-and-boot-
leggers pathway, named after the legendary coalition of actors that supported
alcohol prohibition in the United States (Yandle 1983). At the other extreme,
however, problem linkage operates by persuading actors that value more than
one policy goal. For instance, an investor who wants ﬁnancial proﬁts and to “do
good” might be persuaded to avoid investing in fossil fuels because of the
combination of two rationales (ﬁnancial risk plus avoiding greenhouse gas
emissions), whereas she might be unpersuaded if only one of those rationales
existed. Observational studies like the one in this article cannot evaluate how
much each pathway contributes to behavioral change (or if only one does all
the causal work). Nonetheless, we can distinguish between these two pathways
conceptually. We assume that both are at play in the real world.
Problem linkages broaden the coalition of actors that support the norm,
but if actors are persuaded by utility-based calculations rather than legitimacy-
based calculations, is there really a norm at work? The incidence of purely
moral-based action is hard to prove or disprove, since it requires taking a look
into decision makers’ heads. In fact, we can only have indirect evidence of
norms. Because norms by deﬁnition embody a shared moral assessment,
“norms prompt justiﬁcations for action and leave an extensive trail of commu-
nication among actors that we can study” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 892).
Seen from this perspective, both of our cases clearly qualify as a norm. As
we demonstrate below, there is a shared moral assessment not to subsidize fos-
sil fuels because they are socially regressive and cause damage to the environ-
ment, so there is an emerging FFSR norm. The possibility that some states
reform subsidies only for instrumental reasons does not change the fact that
there is a shared moral assessment to eliminate these subsidies, nor does the
fact that many states still subsidize fossil fuels. In the case of FFD, we clearly
see that even actors that do not comply with the emerging norm (actors that
do not divest) feel compelled to justify why they keep investing in fossil fuels.
1. We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us clarify this point.
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If not for the norm, there would be no need to mention, explain, or justify in-
vestments in fossil fuels at all.
We document in the following two sections an extensive trail of commu-
nication about both FFSR and FFD. We examine the extent to which successful
norm institutionalization and implementation are determined by problem link-
age. We conduct two case studies, examining the variation on the dependent
and independent variables over time.
Case Study: Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR)
First Period: 1980 to Mid-1990s
The FFSR norm has a long history. It was ﬁrst articulated in the 1980s by a num-
ber of NGOs and international organizations (Kosmo 1987; World Bank 1982),
in tandem with the rise of neoliberal ideology and the so-called Washington
Consensus. Deregulation of energy prices had been part of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank conditionality programs since the
1980s. As a result of these programs, some countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, Africa, and Asia partially or completely deregulated their fuel prices
in the 1980s and 1990s (Steenblik 2009, 188). The 1996 fuel price reform in
the Philippines, for example, and the move to market prices for electricity in
Armenia between 1995 and 1999 were part of conditionality programs by the
IMF (Clements et al. 2013).
In this ﬁrst period, the rationale for phasing out energy subsidies was en-
tirely based on their macroeconomic, ﬁscal, and public revenue effects. The
environmental externalities of fossil fuel subsidies were not a major driver
of the push for FFSR. A 1987 World Resources Institute study covered the
macro- and microeconomic effects of subsidies at length, while only cursorily
mentioning their environmental effects (Kosmo 1987). Climate change had
yet to become a major issue on the global political agenda. In terms of our
dependent variable, the FFSR norm was only weakly institutionalized and
rarely implemented.
The environmental rationale for FFSR was ﬁrst articulated in the early
1990s. In 1992, a World Bank study for the ﬁrst time connected the issue to
climate change and calculated the potential carbon dioxide emission reductions
from subsidy removals (Larsen and Shah 1992). The report caught the attention
of the G7 environment ministers, who discussed it in 1994, yet the issue was not
mentioned again in the ﬁnal communiqué of the G7 leaders’ meeting in Naples
later that year (G7 1994a, 1994b), and the issue slid again from the global
agenda. In terms of our hypothesis, the issue of FFSR could not be framed as
a solution to a salient problem that policy makers faced: the G7 countries did
not face any pressing ﬁscal issues in the mid-1990s, and the issue of FFSR had
been linked to climate change only in a single World Bank study.
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Second Period: Late 1990s to Today
The second period, beginning in the late 1990s, marks the start of a transnational
advocacy campaign to reform fossil fuel subsidies. NGOs, such as the Earth
Council, Greenpeace, the International Institute for Sustainable Development,
and the Worldwatch Institute, publicized the issue of “perverse subsidies”—that
is, environmentally harmful subsidies—across different sectors, including fossil
fuels (see, e.g., Myers and Kent 1998). It led Ronald Steenblik (1998, 1), an
ofﬁcial of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), to observe in 1998 that
the issue has been picked up by virtually every major national and interna-
tional environmental NGO and made an integral element of their pro-
grammes of work. Subsidy reform, once the lonely pursuit of ﬁnance
ministries and trade economists, has become a cause célèbre of the green
movement.
At the level of international organizations, the issue was also picked up again
and clearly rooted in the environmental frame. The 1999 edition of the World
Energy Outlook by the International Energy Agency (IEA), for example, put the spot-
light back on the issue of energy subsidies.2 The issue was cast no longer solely in
macroeconomic terms but also in climate terms. The preface of the report, for ex-
ample, mentioned that FFSR has gains “in terms of energy savings, lower carbon
dioxide emissions, improved economic efﬁciency and reduced burdens on gov-
ernment budgets” (International Energy Agency [IEA] 1999, 3). Henceforth, the
environmental case for subsidy reform came more and more to the fore. The
OECD, for instance, published several reports on “environmentally-harmful
subsidies” after 2003 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment 2003, 2005, 2007).
In 2005, the International Institute for Sustainable Development launched
the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI), the ﬁrst NGO dedicated to the issue of
subsidy reform (Lemphers et al. 2018). The group of NGOs decrying subsidies
on environmental grounds continued to grow in number (Van de Graaf and
Blondeel 2018). Efforts to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies gathered momentum
in 2009 when the G20 leaders pledged to phase out fossil fuel subsidies at their
Pittsburgh summit. The Obama administration held the presidency of the G20
and, in the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis, wanted to “creatively link climate
change to the ﬁnancial and ﬁscal issues at the G20 agenda’s core” (Kirton and
Kokotsis 2015, 229). In contrast to 1994, when the G7 leaders neglected the
issue, FFSR now provided a solution to salient problems that world leaders
faced: how to implement budget cuts in the wake of the Great Recession. For
the Obama administration, it was also a way to demonstrate leadership on cli-
mate change in the run-up to the UN Copenhagen climate conference in 2009.
2. On the role of the IEA in global energy governance, see Colgan et al. 2011; Colgan and Van de
Graaf 2015; Van de Graaf and Colgan 2016.
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The norm has since been endorsed at other summits and institutions, in-
cluding at the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation summit and in the UN Sus-
tainable Development Goals. The issue continues to be pushed for by a string of
international organizations (notably the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and IEA),
NGOs (notably the GSI, the Overseas Development Institute, and Oil Change
International), and a club of more than thirty supporting states that call them-
selves the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (Lemphers et al. 2018, Rive
2018; Van de Graaf and van Asselt 2017). In short, the FFSR norm has been very
successfully institutionalized in this second period, especially since 2009.
In terms of implementation, the norm has been moderately successful.
More than forty countries have initiated fossil fuel subsidy reforms in recent years,
and particularly since 2014 (Van de Graaf and Blondeel 2018). In a sample study
of 153 countries, Ross et al. (2017) quantiﬁed that between 2003 and 2015, gas-
oline taxes rose in 83 countries.3 The IEA has calculated that without national
reforms undertaken since 2009, the value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies
would have been 24 percent higher in 2014, putting the level of these subsidies
at US$ 610 billion instead of US$ 493 billion (IEA 2015, 96–97). In 2017, global
consumption subsidies dropped further and amounted to US$ 302 billion, partly
due to lower oil prices but also because of reform efforts (IEA 2018).
Problem linkage has helped this moderate wave of implementation since
2014. To illustrate problem linkage in action, we focus on the GSI, the leading
NGO in this issue area, and examine its country-speciﬁc programs and projects.
We selected the eight countries where the GSI is currently working and that
ﬁgure prominently on its website: Bangladesh, Canada, China, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey (International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment 2018). Table 1 highlights the proclaimed objectives of the GSI’s work on
fossil fuel subsidies in each of the respective countries. It shows that the GSI has
espoused different frames for FFSR, with most emphasizing the key domestic
policy priorities of the norm addressees (e.g., ﬁscal balance, social development,
energy access). Analyses of energy pricing reforms around the world show that
ﬁscal balance was indeed a key driver for reforms and provided a means to ease
public expenditure pressures (Rentschler and Bazilian 2017).
Still, there are limits to how easily FFSR can be implemented, even when
norm addressees—that is, state governments—discursively agree with the norm.
In some countries, consumption subsidies are part of the “social contract” be-
tween governments and the population (Moerenhout et al. 2017). In other
cases, reform measures may get bogged down over popular protests, opposi-
tion of interest groups, or the credibility of the institutions entrusted with
implementing reforms (Inchauste and Victor 2017; Kyle 2018). Reform efforts
have led to unrest in at least nineteen countries since 2006 (Ross et al. 2017).
3. Fossil fuel taxes are an inverse proxy measure for subsidies (Ross et al. 2017). For the IMF,
tax subsidies occur when taxes levied on fossil fuel products are below their efﬁcient level
(Clements et al. 2013).
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Without adequate measures for mitigating these effects, and without compre-
hensive consultation and communication, reforms are likely to face signiﬁcant
resistance.
Thus fossil fuel subsidies remain widespread, and it remains to be seen to
what extent the current reform efforts will be sustained. Still, overall, there is
evidence of moderate implementation of the FFSR norm. Moreover, there is
evidence that policy makers’ perceptions of their interests have changed sufﬁ-
ciently to make the norm durable. For instance, in 2017, higher oil prices led
to a partial rebound in the total value of oil and gas subsidies. The 15 percent
rise in subsidies was, however, considerably less than the 25 percent rise in oil
prices (IEA 2018, 111).
Case Study: Fossil Fuel Divestment (FFD)
First Period: 2011–2014
The FFD campaign began in 2011, when students at Swarthmore College urged
their college to divest from coal stocks (Grady-Benson and Sarathy 2016). In-
spired by the campaign for divestment from apartheid South Africa in the
1980s, they chose divestment as a strategy “because they believed it would ignite
a debate and force the college to take a moral stand on the issue” (Apfel 2015,
Table 1
GSI Country Programs: Objectives
(Macro-)economic Impact Social Development Impact
Environmental
impact:
Environmental
hazards of FFS
Reduce
overall public
expenditure
Level playing
ﬁeld for
clean energy
Equity and
social
development
Gender
sensitivity of
FFSR
Clean energy
access and
use for poor
households
Bangladesh x x x x
Canada x x x
China x x x
Egypt x x
India x x x x
Indonesia x x x x x
Nigeria x x x x
Turkey x x x
Note. Data based on Rentschler and Bazilian (2017, 898).
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915). By spring 2012, the campaign had spread to approximately ﬁfty campuses
(Ayling and Gunningham 2017).
In June 2012, US environmentalist Bill McKibben published a piece on the
issue in Rolling Stone magazine, laying out not only the moral case for divest-
ment but also a ﬁnancial case. He drew on a report by Carbon Tracker Initiative
(CTI) that had been published in November 2011 (Carbon Tracker Inititiative
[CTI] 2011). It was the ﬁrst report to fashion climate change as a ﬁnancial risk
for investors, pioneering concepts such as the “carbon bubble” and “stranded
assets.”4
Initially, the primary goal of the norm entrepreneurs was to delegitimize
investments in the fossil fuel sector because “if it is wrong to wreck the climate,
it is wrong to proﬁt from this wreckage” (McKibben 2013; see also Bratman et al.
2016). This morality frame targeted particular types of mission-driven entities,
notably churches and universities, because they are considered to be more suscep-
tible to such nonﬁnancial arguments. Environmental campaigners also used the
language of “stranded assets” and “carbon bubbles,” but it took some time before
ﬁnancial actors with pre-existing credibility—such as central banks—began to
share this language. This type of norm addressee is primarily concerned with
proﬁt maximization and risk management. Consequently, these conventional in-
vestors are keen to avoid future losses in the value of their assets, and they are
more likely to consider FFD if it can help solve this potential problem. Framing
strategies geared at establishing problem linkages will thus be more convincing
when they relate to the ﬁnancial risks associated with climate change.
At the end of this period, from 2014 onward, the movement started
recording some early successes (Ayling and Gunningham 2017). The philan-
thropic Rockefeller Brothers Fund, an organization with strong historical ties
to the oil industry, announced that it would cut its ﬁnancial ties with the fossil
fuel industry (Rockefeller Brothers Fund 2014). Some of the world’s largest
index providers also started issuing, in 2014, “fossil-free” stock market indices
(FTSE) (Russell 2014; MSCI 2014; S&P Global 2018). The Norwegian Govern-
ment Pension Fund Global (GPFG), the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund,
also started removing companies involved in coal mining, coal-ﬁred power
generation, and oil sands operations from its portfolio (Stortinget 2014-2015),
though it continued to be heavily invested in other parts of the fossil fuel indus-
try. In addition, Shell and Exxon both published reports in 2014 at the request of
investors—but they stated that they did not believe their assets would become
stranded (Ayling and Gunningham 2017).
The dominant theme in this ﬁrst period, however, was initial resistance to
FFD. The experiences of Harvard, Stanford, and Brown Universities reﬂect the ini-
tial failure to link divestment to other salient problems, even for mission-driven
institutions. All three institutions publicly rejected FFD (Healy and Debski 2016).
4. Stranded assets are fossil fuel supply and generation resources that become uneconomic prior
to the expected end of their economic life. Such overvalued assets could generate a carbon
bubble (CTI 2011).
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The Harvard board considered the endowment an economic resource and not an
instrument to impel social or political change (Faust 2013). After a ﬁve-year
student-led campaign, in April 2017, Harvard did announce a pause for new in-
vestments in oil, coal, and gas but not divest of existing holdings. Brown Univer-
sity remained unconvinced that the social harm inﬂicted by the fossil fuel
industry outweighs its social and economic beneﬁts (Paxson 2013). And although
Stanford University decided in 2014 to divest from coal, it rejected a request to
divest its entire endowment from the fossil fuel industry altogether in 2016 on
similar grounds as Brown (Stanford Board of Trustees 2016).
More broadly, investors continued to be hesitant about divestment. Asset
managers have a ﬁduciary duty that legally requires them to seek the best returns
for their clients, irrespective of nonﬁnancial concerns (Center for International
Environment Law 2016). Overall, in this period, the FFD campaign did not
(yet) succeed in linking their moral motivations to the primary concerns of
most mission-driven institutions, let alone those of more conventional ﬁnancial
actors. In terms of our dependent variable, the norm was only weakly institu-
tionalized and hardly implemented at the time.
Second Period: 2015 to Today
In the second period, starting around 2015, the FFD norm gained more success.
One pivotal moment came with Bank of England governor Mark Carney’s 2015
landmark speech on climate change and ﬁnancial stability. As early as 2014,
Carney had been warning that not all fossil fuel reserves could be burned and
that investors ought to consider long-term impacts of their decisions. Impor-
tantly, in his 2015 speech, Carney asserted that investors were at risk of signif-
icant exposure to stranded assets and that frameworks to disclose and manage
these climate-related risks were to be developed.
Carney’s 2015 speech strengthened the ﬁnancial frame for FFD, as it linked
traditional ﬁnancial concepts of risk management, portfolio diversiﬁcation, and
stranded assets to climate change for an audience of investors, insurers, and cen-
tral bankers. In doing so, it broadened the coalition of actors that supported the
norm by driving home the point that the ﬁnancial case for divestment was
strong enough on itself. Consistent with these ideas, the G20 ﬁnance ministers
asked the Financial Stability Board, which Carney chaired at the time, to con-
sider how the ﬁnancial sector could take account of the risks climate change
poses to our ﬁnancial system.5 Large ﬁnancial institutions soon followed suit.
Actors such as HSBC, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup have since issued reports
on how to manage climate-related ﬁnancial risks, both with regard to their own
fossil fuel investments and to assets managed for third parties (Sachs 2015;
Goldman Sachs 2018; HSBC 2015).
5. www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/150417-ﬁnance.html, last accessed September 6, 2019.
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Ahead of the 2017 G20 meeting in Hamburg, Germany, a group of 390
institutional investors with more than US$ 22 trillion in assets demanded con-
tinued support for the 2015 Paris Agreement, stating that “as long-term institu-
tional investors, we believe that the mitigation of climate change is essential for
the safeguarding of our investments.”6 They reiterated their call for action at the
twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP24) in 2018 and noted that
they are “increasingly incorporating climate change scenarios and climate risk
management strategies into their investment processes and engaging with
high-emitting companies.”7
Governments and international organizations have begun to recognize the
issue too. Large ﬁnancial institutions, including multilateral development
banks, export credit agencies, national development agencies, and private ﬁnan-
cial institutions, have divested from thermal coal in particular (Institute for En-
ergy Economics and Financial Analysis 2019). In 2017, the World Bank further
decided to halt investments in upstream oil and gas activities from 2019 onward
(World Bank 2017), thereby greatly expanding an earlier decision to reduce in-
vestments in coal plants. Moreover, at COP24, other major development banks,
including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, pledged to make their in-
vestments compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement (World Bank
2018).
The Norwegian pension fund GPFG is an instructive example of how the
ﬁnancial frame plays a pivotal role in FFD norm adoption. In November 2017,
the Norwegian Central Bank, which manages the GPFG, advised the fund to sell
its oil and gas stocks.8 The advice was based exclusively on ﬁnancial arguments,
consistent with Carney’s themes. In March 2019, the government announced
plans to phase out oil and gas exploration and production companies from
the portfolio of the country’s sovereign wealth fund. The ofﬁcial press release
mentioned that this decision was informed by a wish “to reduce the aggregate
oil price risk in the Norwegian economy.”9 After all, the country is exposed to
oil prices both as a producer and as an investor. The decision affects roughly 150
companies, but that represents just a modest 1.2 percent of the GPFG’s total
equity holdings. Another important caveat is that the fund still appears to be
6. https://globalinvestorcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/3-July-423pm-UK-time-
Global-Investor-Letter-to-G20-Governments.pdf, last accessed September 6, 2019.
7. https://theinvestoragenda.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GISGCC-FINAL-for-G7-with-
signatories_-update-4-June.pdf, last accessed September 6, 2019.
8. www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/news-list/2017/norges-bank-recommends-the-removal-of-oil-
stocks-from-the-benchmark-index-of-the-government-pension-fund-global-gpfg/, last accessed
September 6, 2019. Admittedly, in August 2018, a government commission recommended against
such divestment, also on ﬁnancial grounds. www.regjeringen.no/en/whatsnew/Ministries/ﬁn/
press-releases/2018/energiaksjer-i-statens-pensjonsfond-utland/the-government-pension-fund-
global-should-still-be-invested-in-energy-stocks/id2609203/, last accessed September 6, 2019.
9. www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/excludes-exploration-and-production-companies-from-the-
government-pension-fund-global/id2631707/, last accessed September 6, 2019.
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allowed to invest in oil and gas companies if they have activities in renewable
energy, such as Shell and BP.10
Another notable FFD decision that highlights the importance of linking
moral concerns with a ﬁnancial arguments is that of New York City’s US$ 193
billion pension funds. In January 2018, the city announced its intention to begin
the process of divesting large parts of its funds from fossil fuel reserve owners by
2022. FFD came to the spotlight of local campaigners in the wake of Hurricane
Sandy, which hit New York City in 2012 (ICLEI 2018, 9). Climate concerns were
thus the initial driver for action. Campaigners urged the city to double down on
its climate efforts, starting with coal divestment, because the pension funds’ expo-
sure to coal was less than to oil and gas and because the economic outlook for
coal was stark (ICLEI 2018, 9). Mayor Bill de Blasio supported the call for coal
divestment in 2015. De Blasio’s 2018 divestment announcement married climate
change concerns with ﬁnancial ones (NYC 2018). Hence what started as a
morally inspired campaign around climate change got an economic rationale
attached to it and resulted in a divestment decision.
The divestment movement itself now claims that more than one thousand
divestments have been announced since 2012, and the divesters include, among
others, half of UK educational institutions; insurance giants like Axa and Allianz;
cities like Stockholm, Berlin, and Copenhagen; the government of Ireland; and a
number of faith-based organizations. Gofossilfree.org (2013) estimated as of May
2019 the approximate value of the 1,056 institutions divesting at US$ 8.77 tril-
lion. This ﬁgure should be put into perspective, however, since few of those assets
were ever in the fossil fuels sector initially. Moreover, compliance is uncertain and
monitoring is difﬁcult. Even if some funds are being divested on the equity
markets, those same funds can subsequently ﬂow back to the fossil fuel sector
in the form of loans, debt, or underwriting. So far, in short, there is no system-
atic evidence that the divestment campaign has raised the cost of doing business
for the fossil fuel industry, that is, the cost of raising capital and pursuing new
projects (Hansen and Pollin 2018).
Overall, the linkages that FFD advocates have attempted to persuade only
a minority of investors to date. There is little if any evidence that fossil-free in-
vestments perform better, in terms of return on investment, than conventional
(nondivested) investments (Trinks et al. 2018). Divestment campaigns seem to
do better when linking ﬁnancial arguments to nonﬁnancial ones. This explains
why predominantly faith-based organizations, philanthropic foundations,
(local, regional, and national) governments, NGOs, and educational institu-
tions represent almost 85 percent of all institutional divestment commitments
on the Gofossilfree.org website. Ultimately, the ﬁnance argument rests on the
prediction of future returns, risks, and possible stranding of assets, which are
uncertain.
10. www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/08/norways-1tn-wealth-fund-to-divest-from-oil-and-
gas-exploration, last accessed September 6, 2019.
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Importantly, however, the FFD campaign after the Carney speech began to
sway some actors that were not susceptible to the purely moral argument. While
FFD advocates have discussed climate ﬁnancial risk since the beginning of the
campaign, it was really only after key economic actors with pre-existing credibil-
ity, like Mark Carney, began to speak out about the risk that investors took this
risk seriously. Without this ﬁnancial frame, the coalition of actors supporting
the norm probably would have only consisted of the campaigners, students,
philanthropies, and faith-based organizations. For our dependent variable of
norm success, this means that institutionalization and implementation of the
norm are growing, outside the initial group of mission-driven institutions.
Conclusions
Why do some international norms get institutionalized and spur actors to alter
their behavior, whereas others remain rhetorical aspirations? The question has
profound importance for norm entrepreneurs seeking to make progressive
change in the world. Campaigns against famines, tobacco, slavery, species ex-
tinction, and various forms of pollution have, historically, depended on norm
entrepreneurs successfully turning ideas into action.
In this article, we theorized the importance of problem linkages in explain-
ing the success of norm institutionalization and implementation. We suggest
that such linkages are a means to align the motivations and objectives of norm
entrepreneurs with other problems that norm addressees are concerned with.
Doing so broadens the coalition of actors that support the norm. Not only
do norms have to “ﬁt” with the existing normative environment but a deliberate
and active process of linkage to problems outside the entrepreneurs’ initial pri-
orities is often required to achieve higher degrees of success.
This insight is relevant for a current debate among scholars and activists
about the best approach to producing desirable environmental policy. Scholars
have contrasted an interest-based approach with a more normative approach
(Mitchell and Carpenter 2019). We highlight a middle way: using problem
linkages to combine these two approaches. Together, they tend to have greater
potential to effect policy change than either one does alone.
We applied our framework of problem linkages to energy politics, specif-
ically to two campaigns aimed at curbing fossil fuel subsidies and investment.
In the case of FFSR, the economic rationale was developed ﬁrst. The issue took
on a moral dimension in the late 1990s, when NGOs began to champion the
cause of FFSR on environmental and equity grounds. We found that this prob-
lem linkage broadened the appeal of the norm and helped to institutionalize it
at the global level. Even though the macroeconomic and ﬁscal beneﬁts of re-
form are crucial to explain the diffusion of the FFSR norm, the ancillary climate
beneﬁts also play a key role. They are a primary motivation for norm entrepre-
neurs that push for subsidy reform, including the GSI and the Friends of FFSR.
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In the case of FFD, the environmental and moral frame came ﬁrst, as ar-
ticulated in particular by Bill McKibben and his 350.org campaign. While it had
some success with faith-based organizations and philanthropic organizations,
the divestment norm began to have a broader appeal when moral arguments
were linked to ﬁnancial ones, thanks to economic actors like Mark Carney. This
led the norm to be adopted by actors not morally committed to the cause of
divestment, such as the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, thus broadening
the coalition of actors supporting the norm.
We believe problem linkages can help explain the success of a wide range
of norm campaigns. For instance, efforts to increase foreign aid are often more
successful when they can be linked to donors’ strategic interests (Bermeo 2018).
An example is the use of surplus crops (which would otherwise generate no rev-
enue for farmers) as aid to poor countries (Diven 2001). The concept of prob-
lem linkages also sheds light on the success of the NGO campaign for low-cost
access to HIV/AIDS drugs, where a moral agenda was linked to instrumental
objectives of both generic pharmaceutical companies (which wanted market
share) and developing countries (which faced ﬁscal strain) (Sell and Prakash
2004). Overall, problem linkages offer a useful lens for considering political
and policy change.
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